Personally, I believe the potential ramifications for the West, and particularly the USA, if Ukraine loses could be even more severe than a Suez moment. First, the USA's extensive dependencies may be bigger than what Britain's were due to its central position in the Liberal World Order (LWO), which allo…
Personally, I believe the potential ramifications for the West, and particularly the USA, if Ukraine loses could be even more severe than a Suez moment. First, the USA's extensive dependencies may be bigger than what Britain's were due to its central position in the Liberal World Order (LWO), which allows it to maintain large trade and budget deficits while benefiting from its status as the world's reserve currency. The LWO's informal empire makes developing countries major net capital exporters to the USA, multiplying its risks in a shifting global order. Second, unlike Britain post-Suez, the USA does not have an emerging world order with a 'big brother' (the USA) at its center that it can take a place within to greatly mitigate the impacts of such a significant geopolitical shift (there will belikely something new the West creates but I doubt it will be as beneficial to it as the post war's emerging LWO). This absence of a high quality fallback position could make the adjustment much worse for the USA than for Britain in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis.
Which is why the US will do whatever it takes not to lose. No, intervention will not be popular with the populaces of NATO members. Even Poles, the biggest kneejerk russophobes on the planet, are not enthusiastic about dying for Ukraine.
Doesn't matter. Nobody will ask them their opinion.
Great piece! Well written as usual.
Personally, I believe the potential ramifications for the West, and particularly the USA, if Ukraine loses could be even more severe than a Suez moment. First, the USA's extensive dependencies may be bigger than what Britain's were due to its central position in the Liberal World Order (LWO), which allows it to maintain large trade and budget deficits while benefiting from its status as the world's reserve currency. The LWO's informal empire makes developing countries major net capital exporters to the USA, multiplying its risks in a shifting global order. Second, unlike Britain post-Suez, the USA does not have an emerging world order with a 'big brother' (the USA) at its center that it can take a place within to greatly mitigate the impacts of such a significant geopolitical shift (there will belikely something new the West creates but I doubt it will be as beneficial to it as the post war's emerging LWO). This absence of a high quality fallback position could make the adjustment much worse for the USA than for Britain in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis.
I hope all is well,
Mike
Which is why the US will do whatever it takes not to lose. No, intervention will not be popular with the populaces of NATO members. Even Poles, the biggest kneejerk russophobes on the planet, are not enthusiastic about dying for Ukraine.
Doesn't matter. Nobody will ask them their opinion.